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Security in networks of unmanned aerial vehicles for
surveillance
Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can support surveillance even in areas
without network infrastructure. UAV networks raise security challenges be-
cause of its dynamic topology. The current work proposes a technique for
maintaining security in UAV networks in the context of surveillance, by cor-
roborating information about events from different sources. In this way,
UAV networks can conform peer-to-peer general knowledge inspired by the
principles of blockchain, based on trust policies. This method uses a secure
asymmetric encryption with a pre-shared list of official UAVs. This work
addresses the misinformation detection when an official UAV is physically
hijacked. The novel agent-based simulator called ABS-SecurityUAV shows
the efficacy of the proposed approach.
Keywords: agent-based framework, agent-based simulator, agent-based
social simulation, electric car, electric vehicle, multi-agent system
1. Introduction
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are difficult to maintain because of
the rapidly and dynamic change of the network topology, the short connection
durations, and the frequent disconnections [1]. Some of the challenges are the
(a) trust and information verification, (b) the key distribution for maintaining
secure channels, and (c) the forwarding algorithms for finding the best route.
Some of the most common attacks are (1) identity and geographical position
revealing, (2) Denial of Service (DoS), (3) Sybil attack creating the illusion
of several cars with the same ID, (4) Spam to increase the latency of network
transmissions, (5) Man in the Middle (MiM), in which a node listens and
injects false information in the communication between two nodes, (6) black
hole attack, by always declaring having the shortest path, (7) cheating with
position info.
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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) also usually use ad-hoc networks in the
absence of network infrastructure. In particular, UAVs have been especially
useful for supporting surveillance. In this context, UAVs normally cooperate
for achieving an effective surveillance, like in the work of [2] that proposed a
game-based approach with coordinated motion for optimal coverage, sensor
observation, and cooperative information fusion. UAV have been used for
different surveillance purposes such as the efficient control of a moving crowd
[3] and the continuous inspection with UAVs that are dynamically charged
with an algorithm for maintaining the structural inspection [4]
The communication of UAV networks varies as described in a recent re-
view about classifications and architectures [5]. In VANETS and more con-
cretely in UAV networks, it is necessary to detect the malicious behaviors. In
particular, [6] proposed to use trust management as an alternative to cryptog-
raphy to avoid excessive energy and processing consumption. Trust manage-
ment is based in the assumption that malicious behaviour persist. However,
malicious nodes can avoid this detection by by behaving intelligently. Their
approach uses an UAV-assisted detection mechanism that was able to rapidly
detect misbehaviors of network nodes. In addition, [7] proposed an authen-
tication system for using and encrypted channel for protecting UAVs from
cyber attacks. They tested their approach with commercial UAVs showing
its utility. Agent-based simulators (ABSs) have been useful for testing secu-
rity strategies in different kinds of networks, like ABS-TrustSDN [8], which
allowed to manage trust on network nodes in software-defined networks.
Blockchain improves the security of distributed datasets by sharing and
checking the information by the different implied parties [9]. In this context,
blockchain is a defined as a collaborative security foundation to guarantee the
veracity of information. The survey of [10] describes different kinds of security
threats in blockchain systems and some security enhancement solutions for
them.
In this context, the current work proposes to use a security approach
based on the blockchain principles, for detecting suspicious event reports in
surveillance. This is useful for conforming the distributed trust management
about each UAVs. In this manner, the current work can discriminate UAVs
that may have been compromised. The current approach is illustrated with
a novel ABS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents work related to the current approach for introducing the context of
the proposed contribution. Section 3 presents the novel security method for
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surveillance from UAVs. It defends from official UAVs that may be officially
compromised, and is illustrated with a novel ABS. Section 4 presents the
experimentation of the current approach with the ABS for assessing the cur-
rent approach. Concluding remarks are in section 5, including some possible
future lines of research.
2. Related work
The connectivity in VANETs depends whether the vehicles are coopera-
tive to obtain and end-to-end communication. In this line of work, [11] ana-
lyzed the effect of non-cooperative vehicles on path connectivity in VANETs,
and proposed to use UAVs for assisting the connectivity of VANETs. One
subtype of VANETs are the UAV networks. The survey of [12] analyzes
the existing application of UAVs for civil applications from a communication
viewpoint. UAVs can be used for civil applications such as natural disas-
ter monitoring, border surveillance, emergency assistance, search and rescue
missions, delivery of goods and construction. They conclude that communi-
cation security is essential for guaranteeing the proper communication among
UAVs. All these works motivate the current work about improving the secu-
rity of UAVs when using these for surveillance of controlled areas.
Several works focus on improving security in communications with UAVs.
For instance, [13] presented a mechanism for guaranteeing secure commu-
nications. In particular, they used an iterative algorithm that guaranteed
convergence. They applied a water-filling-based solution to make the algo-
rithm computationally efficient. Their simulation results showed that their
approach enhanced secrecy in comparison to an alternative static solution.
In addition, [14] analyzed the intrusion detection focusing on the false pos-
itive rates. They applied a Bayesian game model for accurately detecting
attacks with low false positive rates. Their simulation results corroborated
that they achieved their goal of this reliable detection. Moreover, [15] studied
the communication security in UAVs. More concretely, they presented low-
cost implementation of the GPS spooling attack and the WiFi attack, which
effectively compromised some UAVs. They also proposed some solutions
for defending from these attacks. However, these works did not guarantee
security in surveillance in case an official UAV was compromised.
UAVs has assisted the communication of other networks. For example,
the work of [16] analyzes the airborne network assisted applications based on
the low-altitude UAVs combined with WLAN mesh networks (WMNs). Since
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WMNs were prone to routing attacks according to their previous analyses,
they proposed the position-aware, secure and efficient mesh routing approach
(PASER). Their experimentations showed that this approach was secure from
the corresponding routing attacks. Nevertheless, this work did not study
the possible vulnerabilities raised by a physical hijacking of an UAV in the
surveillance context.
Some works present mechanisms for achieving surveillance for UAVs. For
example, [17] proposed a mechanism for achieving persistent surveillance
with UAVs considering dynamic aspects of the environment. Their approach
was designed for being tolerant to UAV failures. In addition, [4] proposed
an algorithm for maintaining a permanent and continuous surveillance in-
frastructure of UAVs. In their approach, UAVs were coordinated for auto-
matically charging and flying in a balanced way However, their approach did
not consider security issues such as the fact that an UAV could be physically
attacked and compromised for adopting a malicious behavior.
On the whole, UAVs have a great diversity of applications and in some
cases they need to rely on their own network built upon vehicular-to-vehicular
(V2V) instead of vehicular-to-infrastructure (V2I) ones. Surveillance is one
of the most common applications, and the literature agrees on the impor-
tance of security in UAV networks. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the literature lacks the appropriate methods for preventing from physical hi-
jacking of one official UAV in the context of distributed surveillance of UAVs.
The next section presents the current approach that covers this gap of the
literature.
3. Method for detecting compromised UAVs in surveillance
3.1. Overview and assumptions
In general, this approach is designed to be especially applied in borders
with low transit of people (e.g. in natural borders such as mountains). Fig-
ure 1 shows an overview of the current method for detecting compromised
UAVs in the surveillance context. This approach addresses the distributed
management of an UAV network for detecting people in the surveillance of a
particular wide area. This method is based on the assumption that normally
each person crossing a controlled are is observed by several UAVs, although
not necessarily. This method is inspired by blockchain principles. All the
observations are propagated, and each UAV keeps track of the IDs of all the
authenticated official UAV observers.
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Figure 1: Overview of the detection of compromised UAVs in surveillance
In the current approach, all the UAVs should be officially registered before
the UAV fleet starts surveillance. Each UAV has a list of the public keys of
all the UAVs for signing each message and securely sending it to all UAVs
avoiding MiM attacks by compromised UAVs. In this way, the UAVs can sign
their messages with asymmetric encryption. The messages are forwarded
over the UAV network, and each UAV can know a list of the observers of a
particular person.
An official UAV could be physically captured and compromised. In this
case, this UAV could send fake alerts properly signed in order to disturb the
correct functioning of the UAV network. However, the compromised UAV
cannot alter its identity for impersonating other agents, due to the required
asymmetric encryption for authenticating senders.
Each UAV records the IDs of all the direct observers from the messages,
and checks whether each intruder person is corroborated by at least several
observers. However, UAVs can have a distributed management of trust in
each UAV. This trust would consider the percentage of times a UAV was the
only one in observing an intruder event, penalizing the trust on it. It also
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considers the number of times it sent corroborated information. It would
weight as more relevant the recent cases but it would also consider the whole
history.
In very large areas, funds cannot usually cover an enough amount of UAVs
to provide seamless communications. The current approach assumes that
communications are usually disrupted, in the sense that an UAV may need
to wait after generating a message until it can actually send the message. In
particular, each UAV will wait until another UAV is enough close to actually
communicate with it. Notice that this approach also assumes that UAVs
cannot perform long-distance communications in order to save energy for
having safe and relative long flights. In a similar way, when a UAV receives
a message, it stores the received information for forwarding it to different
UAVs for an established duration.
The current approach is illustrated with an ABS with several agent types.
One agent type is the people for impersonating the intruders. Another agent
type is the UAVs. In addition, UAVs have an internal flag that determines
whether they are compromised.
3.2. Internal functioning of the security approach illustrated with an ABS
model
The current approach is illustrated with the novel ABS called ABS-
SecurityUAV. This ABS was implemented with NetLogo for its support and
utility for representing mobile ad hoc networks [18]. The model of this ABS
was organized in three modules: the “Setup” methods (initially executed at
the beginning of the simulation); the “Go” methods (periodically invoked
in each frame of the simulation); and the “Measure” methods (used for up-
dating the measures of the charts). This structure of modules was designed
considering the common metrics for evaluating agent-oriented architectures
[19] for reducing the coupling between modules and increasing the cohesion
inside each of them. In addition, this ABS was developed considering the
principles of PEABS (a process for developing efficient agent-based simula-
tors) [20] for achieving efficient simulations.
In the Setup methods, UAVs are initialized considering the number en-
tered by the user. One or several of these are compromised taking into
account the number indicated by the user. These UAVs are initially located
in a different place from the other UAVs, simulating that these are physically
hijacked. Then, intruders are initialized if the user indicates so.
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Figure 2: Block diagram of an excerpt of the Go methods of ABS-SecurityUAV
Regarding the Go methods, Figure 2 shows the block diagram of their
most relevant part. The main method is shown in the left side. Firstly, both
UAVs and people move. The former ones use a variable nondeterministic
approach, while people mainly aim at crossing a controlled area following a
specific direction with only slight variations. Then, UAVs detect whether any
person is near. After this, V2V communications are simulated. Finally, the
UAV states are visualized considering the color notation described in section
3.3 and showing some additional information in their labels. The block di-
agram also determines the V2V communications considering separately the
perspectives of senders and receivers. UAVs communicate different messages
regarding whether they have directly observed the intruder or they know it
from other. They respectively encrypt a message for all the official UAVs
or forward the received encrypted message. They only communicate with
nearby UAVs given the energy restrictions. The receptor UAVs save the
encrypted message for later forwarding it. They decrypt its content for up-
dating their local list of direct UAV observers to update their trust on each
UAV.
UAVs have a private key so they can authenticate their identity with
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asymmetric encryption. Each time an UAV observes an event (e.g. a person
crossing the frontier), it communicates to its neighbors. Then, the neighbors
transmit this information to other neighbors recursively and so on. Each
UAV continues moving and keep transmitting the message to new UAVs for a
specific time period. The timeout of direct observers and the timeout of UAVs
forwarding messages are established with two different input parameters. In
order to simulate the timeouts, each UAV has two internal variables that
determine the last times in which respectively it observed a person and it
was alerted by another UAV.
In the trust management, if several UAV neighbors have observed the
same intruder event, they can corroborate the information. The information
that is observed by several UAVs is considered true. The information that is
only observed by one UAV is considered true but suspicious. The UAV that
reports suspicious information is penalized and the neighbors will gradually
lose trust on this UAV. The neighbors of a compromised UAV might detect
their malicious behavior of creating false information, when it continuously
sends suspicious information. In order to keep track of the original UAV
observers from which an UAV has received messages, the latter keeps an
updated list of the IDs of these original observers. It is worth mentioning
that the user can enter an input parameter indicating the minimum number
of direct observers for trusting information. This input parameter is set to
two by default, but the user could change this value.
Given the assumption that there is not enough UAVs to cover all the
area, we have decided to use a strategy that is difficult to be predicted by
intruders. If UAVs moved deterministically, then the intruder could plan a
route that avoids all the UAVs observation areas. Hence, we decided that
in this approach UAVs move in a nondeterministic way, avoiding to be pre-
dicted by intruders. This UAV motion also has the advantage that each
UAV has contact with many other UAVs. In this way, when a UAV starts
having a malicious behavior for being hijacked, many other UAVs would no-
tice conforming a distributed corroborated detection of the hijacked UAV,
in order to exclude its information and alert the official services about it.
The nondeterministic decisions were implemented following TABSAOND (a
Technique for developing ABS Apps and Online tools with Nondeterministic
Decisions) [21]. In this way, a probability was assigned to the decision of
changing the direction, and then this decision was simulated by comparing
a random number with the threshold obtained from this probability. In ad-
dition, the rotation angle was calculated nondeterministically with certain
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limits, as Equation 1 shows:
α =
{
rf (β)− (β/2), if r ≤ pr
0, otherwise
(1)
where α is the angle of rotation (being zero going straight, a positive
number turning right, and a negative turning left), β is the maximum angle
of rotation, rf (x) is a random function that returns a real number between
zero and the x parameter, r is a random real number in the [0, 1] interval,
and pr is the probability of changing the direction of the UAV.
The speed of UAVs was constant. The same formula was used for simu-
lating the movement and direction changes of each person, but its maximum
angle of rotation was much lower, so their path was almost straight. The
speed of the person was also indicated by a different variable from the one
for UAVs.
The methods of the Measure module allows the simulator to present the
evolution of respectively (a) the percentage of indirectly alerted UAVs con-
sidering all the UAVs (referred as ap in equation 2), (b) the percentage of
alerted UAVs that trust the messages considering only the alerted UAVs (de-
noted as t in equation 3), (c) the percentage of UAVs that directly observed
an intruder (dp in equation 4), and (d) the average number of direct observer
UAV IDs stored locally in each alerted UAV (ids in equation 5). Equations
2-5 respectively define these metrics:
ap = a/n (2)
t = at/a (3)
dp = d/n (4)
ids =
∑
x∈A |lx|
a
(5)
where a is the number of UAVs alerted by other UAVs, n is the total num-
ber of UAVs, at is the number of UAVs that trust the information received
by other UAVs about an intruder, d is the number of UAVs that directly
observed and reported an intruder, A is the set of all the alerted UAVs, and
lx is the list of direct UAV observer IDs stored locally in the UAV x.
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The hijacked UAVs move as any other UAVs. The only difference is that
they continuously report fake alerts of intruders. Their goal is to make the
fleet of UAVs report false alarms, so that the system loses credibility and
users may start ignoring it. In this way, a real intruder could go through the
controlled area when UAV alarms are ignored.
3.3. User interface of the novel ABS-SecurityUAV
Figure 3 shows the user interface (UI) of ABS-SecurityUAV. In the left
side, user can enter certain numeric input parameters in the corresponding
input fields. The user can indicate the number of UAVs in the simulation.
They can also indicate the number of compromised UAVs and the number
of people crossing the controlled area, to test different scenarios. They can
also indicate the time-out duration for forwarding alert messages through
V2V communications in the “duration-v2v” parameter. In addition, the
“duration-alert” determines the time-out duration while a direct observer
transmit its message to the nearby UAVs. Further, the “trust-threshold”
parameter indicates the number of direct UAV observer IDs necessary for
trusting the information. For example, two would indicate that at least two
IDs are necessary for corroborating the information.
The UI has two buttons respectively labeled as “setup” and “go”. The
former one allows users to establish the initial state of the simulation using
the parameters indicated in the input number fields. The latter button allows
both running and pausing the simulation evolution.
UI shows a graphical representation of the locations and information of
the UAVs in a wide square area, as shown in the right side of Figure 3.
UAVs are represented with an airplane icon. The colors of UAVs represent
different states. Blue represents the default state of flying without detecting
any person. A red UAV means that it has directly observed a person. A green
UAV represents that it has received a message of alert from another UAV
regardless this was a direct observer or was indirectly alerted. In addition,
each UAV shows a list of the direct UAV observer IDs from which it has
received an alert. This distributed information was inspired by blockchain
principles for corroborating information.
In addition, ABS-SecurityUAV shows some charts in the UI for represent-
ing the evolution of some global measurements in the simulation evolution.
Figure 4 shows these charts for a simulation execution example. The upper
chart shows the evolution of the percentage of direct observers reporting a
10
Figure 3: Main part of the user interface of ABS-SecurityUAV
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Figure 4: Charts of the user interface of ABS-SecurityUAV
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person detection. It also presents the evolution of the percentage of UAVs in-
directly alerted in the simulation. This chart also represents the evolution of
average trust on a given person detection based on the local corroborations in
each UAVs. The lower chart represents the number of alert IDs considering
only the UAVs that have been alerted.
4. Experimentation
In order to assess the current approach, we performed several simulations
with 100 UAVs. We set a time out duration of 1000 s for both V2V commu-
nications and for transmitting direct observations. The trust threshold was
two indicating that at least two UAVs were necessary for corroborating the
information. Firstly, we run simulations for an scenario in which we assumed
that a real-person was crossing the controlled area. This scenario had one
simulated person and zero compromised UAVs. In a second scenario, we sim-
ulated the existence of one compromised UAV sending false alerts without
any person crossing the controlled area.
Figure 5 shows the results in the scenario in which a real person was
crossing the controlled area. This chart shows the percentage of UAVs that
were aware of this human intruder under the label “indirectly alerted”. These
UAVs did not directly observed the intruder, but they received the informa-
tion. One can observe that this amount gradually increased for the occurring
event, and reaches high values in the interval 90-100%. Thus, the informa-
tion spread worked properly in true positives (i.e. when an intruder entered
the controller area) according to the results. The percentage of alerted UAVs
that trust this information reaches initial values in the interval 40-80%, when
there were several direct observers. The variability of initial period was prob-
ably due to the small sample of alerted UAVs, which reflected big changes
with each change in an UAVs. When the simulation continues, one con ob-
serve that trust increased and became stable around 90%. The chart also
presents the percentage of UAVs that directly observed the intruder. One
can observe that even with a relative small percentage (i.e. in the 0-8% in-
terval), the distributed trust properly coincided the reality with high values
(around 90%).
Figure 6 shows the same information as in the previous chart, but in the
scenario without any real intruder. An UAV simulated to be compromised,
alerting about a false intruder detection. This false information was spread
to the UAVs reaching the interval 90-100% of indirectly alerted UAVs at the
13
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Figure 5: Results when a person was crossing the controlled area
end of the simulation. However, this chart shows that the trust remained as
zero in the whole evolution. This information was never completely trusted,
as it was never corroborated by any other direct observer. In fact, the chart
also reveals that there was only one direct observer (the UAV with malicious
behavior) along all the simulation. Therefore, the current approach properly
detected the misbehavior of the compromised UAVs when alerting about a
false event.
Figures 7 and 8 show the average number of the direct UAV observer IDs
known by each alerted UAV. Since only the alerted UAVs were considered for
this average, the least positive value was one because each UAVs was alerted
at least by one. In case, there is not any alert, then the simulator presents
the zero value. The difference between both charts is that Figure 7 presents
the results of a simulation with a real intruder, while Figure 8 shows the
results of a simulation without any real intruder and a compromised UAV
faking alerts. One can observe that the real person was initially detected
with an evolving average within [1.5, 2.0] interval. Then, when most UAVs
were alerted, the propagation of the real observer alerts was spread, gradually
increasing the number of UAV IDs. By contrast, in the case of fake alerts by
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Figure 6: Results when an UAV was compromised
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
16
00
18
00
20
00
22
00
24
00
26
00
28
00
30
00
32
00
34
00
36
00
38
00
40
00
42
00
44
00
46
00
48
00
N
um
be
r	o
f	A
le
rt
	ID
s
Time	(s)
Figure 7: Average number of alert IDs when a person was crossing the controlled area
a compromised UAVs, the number of alert IDs remains as one from the first
alert. This allows the distributed system to detect the suspicious behavior
over the time and confirm its malicious behavior.
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Figure 8: Average number of alert IDs when an UAV was compromised
5. Conclusions and future work
This work has presented a security mechanism for detecting compromised
UAVs in UAV networks for supporting surveillance. It is based on the as-
sumption that people will be usually observed by more than one UAV. Hence,
if a UAV repeatedly report people that any other UAV does, each UAV
will detect this fact following an information diffusion approach inspired in
the blockchain principles. We developed the novel simulator called ABS-
SecurityUAV to illustrate this approach. The experimentation results show
its efficacy.
The current work is planned to be extended by testing this approach
in real-world UAVs. In particular, we plan to apply this approach in the
surveillance of schools for detecting bullying activities and reporting these to
the school authorities. This work may also be tested for assisting military
operations in detecting possible threats in critical areas and the surveillance
of the surroundings of military bases that are far from cities.
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